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Hunger as a policy instrument? 
Some reflections on workfare and forced labour  
 
Prof. dr. G.J. Vonk1 
 
In our social security systems the harsh work test has been replaced by a more 
moderate system which tries to strike a balance between the right to benefit and the 
obligation to work. This balance is, however, shifting is a result of the workfare 
approach. This approach, generally advocated to activate social security claimants, 
is not devoid of dangers. Social security administrations may exercise indiscriminate 
powers over individuals. And, if pursued too ruthlessly, activation policies which are 
designed to be beneficial for the citizens may have the opposite effect, condemning 
‘those who stay behind’ to a permanent underclass. It is up to the courts to restore 
the balance between the rights and obligations. As long as the rule of law is upheld 
the dangers of the workfare approached can be kept at bay. This requires an active 
attitude of the courts and a strict focus upon the protection of human rights. When 
dealing with the prohibition of forced labour both the European Court of Human 
Rights and some national courts tend to apply these rights too restrictively. In this 
article it is argued that it is no longer acceptable to reject outright the relevance of 
the prohibition of forced labour in social security cases. Instead, minimum 
standards for testing the legality of workfare practices should be developed. These 
should refer to the nature and duration of public employment duties, as well as to 
the severity of the sanctions. The recent decision of the Dutch district court of 






The title for this treatise which I was invited to reflect upon, is a provocative one. The 
notion of “hunger as a policy instrument” implies that states consciously use the 
deprivation of people to realize certain public goals. Perhaps such policies are 
conceivable in periods of (temporary) 2 loss of civilization but otherwise? Modern 
civilized states adhere to the rule of law. They have accepted socio-economic 
fundamental rights, such as the right to a decent standard of living and the right to social 
security. These rights presuppose that nobody deserves to be poor and that states are 
under a duty to create a welfare system, in whatever form, which is aimed at alleviating 
the needs of the masses, without threatening the livelihood of others. Should we really 
question the sincerity of the efforts of states in this field?  God have mercy on the cynics! 
 
But suppose we would approach the phenomenon of hunger not so much from the point 
of view of official policies, but rather from the function it has in  crafting relations in our 
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 Conceivable? I never forget my disbelief when I read for the first time that somewhere in the machinery 
of Nazi Germany a plan had been deployed to literally starve the slave people in order to create 
Lebensraum for themselves. 
society, as some sociologists want us to do? Then it is true that it can be an easy 
instrument in the hands of some to force others (the poor) into certain behaviour. Even 
though official policy would not readily formulate it in these terms, the fact remains that 
the threat of taking away the livelihood of social security beneficiaries, can be used as a 
disciplinary tool. Indeed, in literature this disciplinary function of social welfare law, in 
particular the application of the so called ‘work test’ in some social security schemes (in 
particular unemployment benefits and social assistance) is widely accepted. 3 
 
In this contribution I touch upon the instrumental perspective of poverty in our social 
welfare systems (withholding benefit rights to enforce certain behaviour). Firstly, I will 
describe how the previously existing harsh and unforgiving attitude towards poverty  has 
given way to a right based approach. This is reflected in the state of the law which 
attempts to strike a careful balance between the right to benefit and the work obligations 
of the beneficiary. Such balance can for example be illustrated with reference to the 
concept of ‘suitable employment’ used in various social security acts. (paragraph 2) 
Secondly, I will demonstrate how the balance between rights and duties runs the risk of 
being disturbed as a result of the modern workfare approach, adopted by an increasing 
number of states. This approach combines a strict work test and sanctions with far 
ranging discretionary powers for the administration. If handled in the wrong way, this 
may result in repressive practices which ignore the right to social security for the 
individual claimant (paragraph 3). Thirdly and finally, I will argue that governments, and  
in particular courts are under a duty to maintain the balance between rights and 
obligations, by giving effective application to the fundamental right to the right to work 
and the prohibition of forced labour (paragraph 4). 
 
In literature workfare policies are very often discussed within the context of the welfare 
state at large. The concept of the welfare state is wider than the concept of social security.  
In the first place ‘welfare’ refers not only to the provision of income security in case of 
poverty or certain risks, such as unemployment and old age, but to the whole spectrum of 
government action intended to makes sure that citizens meet their basic needs, such as 
education, housing and  health. In the second place ‘welfare’ does not only refer to cash 
benefits schemes, but also to various types of services and in-kind programmes often 
considered to fall outside the social security domain, such as probation and parole, child 
protection services, socialization services, etc.4 As I am mostly focussing on the work test 
as a condition for receiving unemployment and social assistance cash benefits, this article 
is confined to the subject of social security only. 
 
Although the questions and issues raised will be dealt with in a general manner, the 
situation in the Netherlands is taken as a fixed point of reference. 
 
2. Social security and work as fundamental rights 
 
In the pre-modern period there was no need for the society to worry too much about 
activating the poor into work. Hunger drove the masses into activity. Only with the 
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emergence of the first public relief schemes did work incentives have  to be organized. 
Thus, the nineteenth century poor laws made a clear cut distinction between the deserving 
poor and the undeserving. Those who were not incapacitated as a result of sickness, 
handicap or old age (the so called able bodied) were forced to participate in publicly 
organized employment. Work houses were set up in which men, women and children had 
to carry out manual activities in miserable conditions for long hours a day. There was no 
easy escape from the work house. Dealing with poverty was considered to be part of the 
policing function of the state. Vagrancy was a criminal offence. Sometimes vagabonds 
were literally rounded up and kept in confinement in forced labour camps.5  Especially 
during the 19th century, a period during  which the state had largely withdrawn from 
society and many traditional forms of care had eroded under the influence of the 
industrial revolution, poverty and poor law dependency were a terrible ordeal for the 
people involved.6   
 
During the course of the 20th century the conditions improved. Work houses were 
abolished and the notion of public charity gradually eroded in favour of legal guarantees 
for the beneficiary.  After the Second World War these developments culminated in the 
recognition to social security and work as human rights. Nowadays we believe that 
nobody deserves to be poor, that everybody should be able to earn his living in an 
occupation freely entered upon (the right to work) and that there should be a system for 
the protection of major risks ensuing from labour and life and poverty in general (the 
right to social security).  
 
The right to work is adopted in the national constitutions of many countries, as well as in 
various international instruments on socio-economic fundamental rights, such as the 
European Social Charter (ESC7) and the International Covenant on social, economic and 
cultural rights (ICESCR8). It is not easy to catch the meaning of this right in a single 
phrase. On the one hand it presupposes a positive obligation of the state to strive for  a 
high and stable level of employment and to provide and promote employment services 
and occupational training. On the other hand it displays characteristics of a freedom right 
where it protects the freedom of occupation. In the latter sense the right to work is related 
to the prohibition of slavery and forced labour, adopted in the other human rights 
instruments, such as the International Covenant on economic, social and cultural rights 
(art. 6) the European Convention on human rights (art. 4) and conventions of the ILO9.  
 
The right to social security is not one-dimensional either. It is generally understood that it 
presupposes a final responsibility for the state to set or orchestrate a system of income 
protection for a number of social risks, such as unemployment, sickness, invalidity, old 
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age, etc. and a basic floor for persons who are left without any other resources.10 Also the 
rule of law is considered fundamental for the right to social security as a human right. 
The previously existing system of charity and poor laws did not presuppose a legal 
obligation to provide benefit. This was a matter of discretion for the institutions which 
are  -at most- under a moral obligation to deliver.  Consequently, in a charitable system 
there cannot be any corresponding right to a benefit either for the recipient. The right to 
social security however presupposes a system under which persons are entitled to 
support. This suggests that the beneficiary has some sort of legally defined position.11 
The inference of a legally defined position is that claims should be vested in the law and 
can be enforced. 
 
When we combine the right to work and the right to social security, it follows that it is no 
longer acceptable to require a person to offer his  physical capacities to  some form of 
organized employment in direct return for  public support. Indeed, when we look at our 
present day social security systems it appears that the relation between benefit entitlement 
and duty to  work is no longer construed in this way. A person qualifies for benefit when 
he or she satisfies certain objective conditions and then has to accept certain obligations. 
These obligations may very well involve a duty to work and accept offers of 
employment, but as a starting point, the beneficiary is allowed to choose the employment 
himself on the free labour market, thereby taking into account the job offers that are made 
to him by the labour exchange or social security authorities. Moreover the concept of 
employment is a qualified one. It refers to suitable employment. It has been argued that  
the right to work should be interpreted as a right to obtain suitable employment and that 
work undertaken under pressure of need (the withdrawal of benefit) is not suitable within 
the meaning of the relevant standards of the ILO.12 In my eyes this might be too 
optimistic, but at least the term suitable employment presupposes that the work must 
somehow be fitted to a person’s capacities, experience, education, etc. Whether or not 
this is the case should be established on the basis of individual merits. Finally, the 
sanctions which may be imposed if a person refuses to accept suitable employment are to 
be regulated by the law. They should be proportionate and the claimant should have  
access to an independent judge if he or she wishes  to dispute the decision of the 
administration.  
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197 (as a summary of the authors valuable doctoral thesis, Passende arbeid als recht van de mens, recht op 
arbeid en op werkloosheidsuitkering in internationaal en Nederlands recht,  Kluwer 1994).. 
If we accept this description as an abstract model for applying the work test in modern 
social security systems, it follows that a harsh work test is replaced by a more moderate 
system which tries to strike a balance between the right to benefit and obligation to work 
 
3. Workfare and the effect on the balance between rights and duties 
 
The balance between rights and duties in our social welfare system is, however, shifting. 
More emphasis is placed on the participatory function of social security and the 
enforcement of rules while social security’s function in protecting income is pushed to 
the background. These changes, which have particularly affected the area of social 
assistance, are often referred to as the “workfare” approach. 13  In a more narrow sense of 
the word the term workfare is reserved for the situation in which claimants of social 
assistance are required to perform work, often in public-service jobs, as a condition of 
receiving aid. The latter, narrow definition immediately brings us to the heart of the 
matter: does workfare reintroduce the 19th century practice of  requiring “a person to 
offer his physical capacities to some form of organized employment in direct return for 
public support ”, as I phrased it above?. 
 
The answer to this question is not necessarily affirmative. As will be pointed out below, 
much depends on the legal guarantees surrounding the workfare programmes. But before 
we embark on this subject, let us first of all  have look at how the workfare approach 
might upset the balance between rights and obligations that  has gradually developed in 
our social security systems.  
 
Indiscriminate powers over the individual  
One of the characteristics of the legislative changes which are introduced under influence 
of the workfare approach is the erosion of the legally defined position for the beneficiary 
in favour of more discretion for the local authorities  responsible for benefit payments .  
Thus, for example with respect to  the new Dutch Work and Assistance Act (2003) 
municipalities have been given wide ranging powers in the area of the activation of 
beneficiaries and the imposition of sanctions. The powers are partly regulated  in the 
form of local council regulations and policy guidelines, but sometimes powers are 
directly placed in the hands of  individual administrators. The purpose of the Work and 
Assistance Act is to provide tailor made solutions. The obligations or sanctions to be 
imposed upon the individual claimant are to be established on a case by case basis; each 
claimant should get the treatment that he or she deserves. In this way social assistance has 
once again become a matter of unilateral, discretionary judgment of the authorities 
involved. In the meanwhile work first projects have sprung  up all over the place. In these 
projects young people, new claimants and sometime also those who have been on benefit 
for a long period are obliged to carry out services for the community, in the parks, in 
work factories or as street cleaners. Those who do not join in will be confronted with 
benefits cuts.  
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The danger of wide ranging discretionary powers is simply that these powers may be 
applied too rigorously. Local councils, or indeed individual administrators, may hold 
extreme views on the duties of the claimants of benefit and impose unfair demands and 
disproportionate sanctions.  If the powers of the councils or administrators are not 
properly counterbalanced by the legal rights of the beneficiaries, this might give rise to 
forms of abuse For example, what should be made  of the suggestion put forward   in 2005 
by the former Dutch Minister of Social Affairs, De Geus, that prostitution should be 
accepted as suitable employment? Or the Enschede local authority that threatened to 
force women on social assistance to join a dating agency in the hope that they would 
catch a man with money of his own?  These examples refer to incidents which were 
intensively debated but never became reality. But one has to remain vigilant. Just Google 
the Dutch terms for “social assistance” (bijstand)  “forced labour” (dwangarbeid) and one 
is bombarded with hits  which tell stories of claimants of social assistance who feel 
degraded, bullied or exposed by the  workfare practices. However subjective these stories 
may be, they do testify that the balance between rights and duties has shifted.   
 
Exclusionary effects 
The second danger presents itself on the level of the society as a whole. To what extent 
do workfare policies really contribute to the emancipation of the poor? This question has 
been emphatically raised by the French born sociologist Loïc Wacquant in a book called 
Punishing the poor, from welfare state to penal state.14  In this book the author gives a 
disturbing insight into some developments in the US 
 
The American system of social assistance has been reformed in 1996 by an act with the 
ominous title Personal responsibility and work opportunity reconciliation act. The 
initiative for the reform came from the conservative politician Clay Shaw but the act was 
signed by Bill Clinton.  The reform created a synthesis between the Democratic belief in 
activating policies and the Republican dogma of personal responsibility. The changes in 
the American system are similar to those that were introduced in the Netherlands, but 
they were earlier, more radical and on a grander scale. The system operates on the basis 
of block grants paid out by the central government to the various states. The grants are 
only payable when the states satisfy certain conditions: benefit dependency may not last 
longer than five years, a certain percentage of the beneficiaries must have found paid 
employment, and lack of co-operation on the part of the claimants must be punished with 
benefit cuts. 
 
Wacquant is outspokenly negative about the new American social assistance system. 
According to the author one half of the claimants finds employment in temporary low 
paid jobs which condemn the persons involved to a permanent state of poverty. The other 
half simply disappears out of the system and will be adopted in the anonymity of the 
urban slums. According to Wacquant, this is symptomatic of the changes which are 
occurring in the US. Problems are no longer solved on the basis of a social agenda. 
Instead the citizen is made fully responsible for his own life and the degree in which he 
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or she can participate in the society. Where these policies fail the state reacts with 
sanctions and criminal measures. Since 1970, the number of prisoners has more than 
quadrupled (442%). This rise mostly involves small-scale offenders, drug addicts and the 
homeless. The majority originates from the poorer segments of the society. Most of them 
are black. One out of three black males would be subject to some form of criminal 
surveillance. It is as if Dickensian times are reviving again: the prison house as an 
alternative for social security. In the meanwhile maintaining the repressive system 
requires a huge public investment. Thus, according to the author, the ‘light’ American 
liberal state has developed a ‘heavy’ substructure to suppress the poor.  
 
In the Netherlands, evaluations of the new social assistance legislation that came into 
force in 2003 show the same sort of ambivalence as in the US. On the one hand they are 
positive because more people who have found paid employment. On the other hand there 
are concerns about the quality of the jobs involved and there is a similar problem 
concerning the beneficiaries that simply no longer appear on the records; what happened 
to them?15  Another parallel relates to the repressive nature of the workfare policies. The 
public tolerance for those who do not adhere strictly to the rules and regulations has 
plummeted and the intensity of the sanctions (in number and severity) has increased. The 
dark side of the policies are mostly ignored. For example, hardly any attention is paid to 
research outcomes which point out that most of the fraud is committed unwillingly, due 
to a lack of understanding of the exact nature of the rules and bureaucratic obligations.16 
In the meantime also in the Netherlands the number of prisoners has exploded; 
quadrupled since 1984. And again we are not dealing with heavy criminals but with 
representatives of the marginal groups in the society, such as the homeless, problematic 
youths and foreigners.17 
 
In my view, these developments should be critically monitored, because, however biased 
Wacquant’s analysis may be, it does contain a warning. The warning is that, if pursued 
too ruthlessly activation policies designed to be beneficial for the citizens may  have the 
opposite effect, condemning ‘those who stay behind’ to a permanent underclass. 
Incidentally, this is also the conclusion of comparative study on workfare policies in the 
US and Europe by Joel F. Handler which repeatedly points at the risk that workfare 
policies have an exclusionary effect for those who are least employable.18   
 
4. Workfare or forced labour? 
 
Despite the dangers described above, it is important to bear in mind that the introduction 
of workfare policies does not necessarily imply a re-introduction of 19th century 
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States and Western Europe, The Paradox of Inclusion,  Cambridge studies in law and society,  Cambridge, 
2004, 245.  
repressive practices. In the first place according to the general workfare philosophy 
forced public employment is not a goal in itself, but a first step on the ladder towards 
participation in the normal labour market. One could argue that the more successful 
workfare programmes are in realising an effective flow to regular employment, the more 
justified it is to make claimants perform tasks as a first step towards activity. In the 
second place, workfare practices do not operate in a void, but within the context of the 
law. This infers that claimants have a legal remedy when they feel that their rights are 
being infringed. It is then up to the courts to restore the balance between the rights and 
obligations. As long as the rule of law is upheld the dangers of the workfare approach 
described in the previous paragraph can be kept at bay. This presupposes an active 
attitude of the courts and a strict focus upon the protection of human rights. After all, it is 
the judge who must eventually test the legality of benefit cuts and sanctions and it is case 
law that must provide a framework of criteria for judging the validity of obligations 
imposed on the beneficiaries.  
 
In order for the courts to exercise their corrective powers workfare practices should come 
within the realm of the law in the first place. That they do, seems perfectly obvious, but 
in reality this is not always recognized.  Thus, for example, I came across an article in the 
New York Times, dealing with a decision of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission of 30th September 1999 in which it was ruled that the New York 
administration had violated federal law when it turned away women who said they were 
being sexually harassed while working for their public assistance benefits.19 The 
allegations were very serious but the city had maintained that the women were not 
employees and had no legal right to protection from sex discrimination in the workplace, 
so it refused to co-operate with the proceedings. The case perfectly illustrates the 
harshness of the new policies and the responsibility of the courts (or as the case may be: 
independent tribunals) to restore the balance between rights and obligations. 
 
The right to work (in particular the freedom of occupation) and the prohibition of slavery 
and  forced labour as contained in several international human rights instruments may 
play an important role in providing a framework for testing the legality of workfare 
practices. But curiously there are hardly any national or international cases in which 
concrete decisions of social security administrations to withhold benefit rights were 
considered to be in violation of any of these rights, at least not that I am aware of. The 
general understanding seems to be that work duties may be imposed as a benefit 
condition and that withholding benefit rights does not impede someone’s freedom of 
occupation, let alone constitute forced labour. Thus, in the case of Johan Henk Talmus v. 
the Netherlands the (then) European Commission on Human rights ruled that benefit cuts 
that were imposed because the applicant had refused to look for suitable employment, did 
not infringe art. 4  ECHR. (prohibition of slavery and forced labour)  “In order to qualify 
for unemployment benefits (...) the applicant was required to look for and accept 
employment which was deemed suitable for him. Since he refused to comply with this 
condition, his benefits were temporarily reduced. It does not appear, however, that the 
applicant was in any way forced to perform any kind of labour or that his refusal to look 
for employment other than that of independent scientist and social critic made him liable 
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to any measures other than the reduction of his unemployment benefit. In these 
circumstances, the Commission cannot find that the present complaint raises any issues 
under Articles 4 para. 2, 9 and 1 of the Convention”20  
 
Similarly, in 2002 a Danish court did not accept that a suspension of benefit upon a 
refusal to accept an activation offer, was contrary to art. 4 ECHR. The Danish welfare-to-
work option (activation offer) that the person had received was considered to be fair, in 
the sense that he was able to carry out the work, and that the objective of the requirement 
for participation in the welfare-to-work programme as a condition for receiving cash 
benefits was to become self-supporting. The only consequence of the plaintiff’s refusal to 
participate in the welfare-to-work programme was that he, while the job offer was open, 
lost his entitlement to cash benefits. According to the court there was neither evidence in 
the wording of the ECHR, nor in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights to 
assume that the connection between participation in a welfare-to-work programme and 
the reception of cash benefits could imply a threat of “punishment” within the meaning of 
art. 4 of the Convention. 21 
 
 
Likewise in a recent judgement the local Amsterdam court ruled that the duty of a social 
assistance claimant to work in a sweet factory did not constitute forced labour, because 
the applicant was not coerced into anything, also not when his benefit would be 
suspended. Moreover the work duty had to be considered as a “normal civic obligation” 
as being one of the exceptions referred to in art. 4.22 
 
I have great trouble in accepting the way courts tend to reject outright the relevance of the 
prohibition to forced labour in social security cases. Firstly, by doing so courts fail to 
appreciate the great responsibility which rests upon them to protect the proper balance 
between rights and obligations in times of the introduction of workfare policies. 
Secondly, the case law does not recognize that withholding benefits rights may constitute 
a serious form of pressure and coercion upon the person involved. According to the 
European Court of human rights forced labour is labour exacted under menace of any 
penalty and performed against the will of the person involved, that is work for which he 
has not offered himself voluntarily”23 I fail to see why  under some circumstances, 
particularly long term benefit dependency, sanctions would not amount to such penalty. 
And finally, the case law still seems to be based on the underlying assumption that 
nobody is forced to apply for social security benefits. But in my view the point of 
reference for judging the question of whether freedom rights are violated should not be 
the freedom to apply for a benefit, but rather the right to social security as a fundamental 
right for all.  
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5. A fresh approach: the district court of Arnhem, 8 October 2008 
 
I would welcome a more critical approach to be adopted in case law. Referring to the 
general criteria which have been developed by the European Court of Human Rights in 
respect of the probation of forced labour and compulsory employment contained in art. 4 
ECHR, in particular in the cases of Van der Mussele and Siliadin24 it should be possible 
to extract a number of minimum standards for testing the legality of workfare practices. 
There are three elements which in my view should be tested critically, i.e. 
 
- the nature of the employment 
- the duration of the employment 
- severity of the sanction 
 
With regard to the nature of the employment a distinction must be made between labour 
which is carried out under a regular contract of service and labour in public employment 
in consideration for the payment of benefits. When dealing with the second type of 
labour, special attention should be paid to the question of whether the labour suits a 
person’s physical and mental capacities and is in line with the official policy objective of 
workfare, i.e. it should be conducive to one’s personal development and the improvement 
of one’s chances on the regular labour market. Degrading or useless activities shall not be 
allowed. 
 
With regard to the second element of the duration,  I am of the opinion that it is not 
allowed to require a person to carry out public duties on a more or less permanent basis. 
When, after a couple of  years person in question still has not found a regular job, the 
civic work duties should be ended to allow a person to choose voluntary activities or 
sheltered employment.  
 
Finally, with regard to sanctions, it may be argued that a refusal to accept work duties 
may only be penalized by temporary or partial benefit cuts. Full and permanent benefit 
cuts shall not be permitted. 
 
Just before submitting this article a local court in Arnhem passed a judgement which 
must be considered a major break through in this matter.25 The case dealt with a social 
assistance beneficiary with an academic background who had been told to accept certain 
activities, offered to him by  ‘training centre’, a facility set up under the work first 
programme of the town of Arnhem.. The beneficiary was told to sign a ‘job experience 
agreement’ under which he was given the choice either to work as a  public gardener 
(weeding, hoeing), or to pack boxes of super glue. The beneficiary had signed the 
agreement but subsequently refused to co-operate in the activities imposed on him by his 
‘case manager’. This resulted in a penalty of a 40% benefit cut, during the period of one 
month. The beneficiary appealed against this penalty in an attempt to force the court to 
take a principle stance about the work first duties in relation to the prohibition of forced 
labour.  In its judgement the court came to the conclusion that the practices of the local 
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council of Arnhem were not contrary to the  prohibition of slavery and forced labour 
contained in art. 4 ECHR. The fact that the work fare activities were  not voluntary 
because imposed under the threat of a penalty, did not alter this conclusion because, 
according to the court, social assistance merely is a safety net which presupposes a 
person to return to paid employment a soon as possible. But while on the one hand the 
court ruled that in this case the activities offered should not be considered as 
disproportionate and excessive, it did on the other hand envisage that work first practices 
may run contrary to art. 4 ECHR, i.e. in the case of a beneficiary who is forced to carry 
out activities under threat of a penalty for a longer time when it is clear that such 
activities are in no way conducive to the re-integration in the regular labour market. 
Eventually the court ruled that the penalty imposed by the Arnhem council was unlawful, 
because the council had failed to make clear that the activities in question could have a 
positive impact upon the job opportunities of the person involved, leaving aside whether 
there was a breach of art. 4 ECHR or not.  
 
As said, for our subject this judgment of the Arnhem court constitutes a major break 
through. Not only is it novelty that a court admits that forcing beneficiaries into activities 
in return to benefit payments may constitute forced labour or compulsory employment, 
but also we begin to see the first contours of the criteria which benefit agencies engaged 




In this article I have described how the harsh work test applied in the 19th century has 
gradually softened.  As a consequence of the right to work and the right to social security 
the harsh work test has been replaced by a more moderate system which tries to strike a 
balance between the right to benefit and the obligation to work. This balance is, however, 
shifting is a result of the workfare approach. This approach, generally advocated to 
activate social security claimants, is not devoid of dangers. Social security 
administrations may exercise indiscriminate powers over individuals. And, if pursued too 
ruthlessly, activation policies which are designed to be beneficial for the citizens may 
have the opposite effect, condemning ‘those who stay behind’ to a permanent underclass. 
It is up to the courts to restore the balance between the rights and obligations. As long as 
the rule of law is upheld the dangers of the workfare approached can be kept at bay. This 
requires an active attitude of the courts and a strict focus upon the protection of human 
rights. When dealing with the prohibition of forced labour both the European Court of 
Human Rights and some national courts tend to apply these rights too restrictively. I have 
argued that it is no longer acceptable to reject outright the relevance of the prohibition of 
forced labour in social security cases. Instead, minimum standards for testing the legality 
of workfare practices should be developed. These should refer to the nature and duration 
of public employment duties, as well as to the severity of the sanctions. The recent 
decision of the Dutch district court of Arnhem of 8 October 2008 constitutes a perfect 
illustration of such an alternative approach.  
 
